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Abstract:  
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are responsible for monitoring and analyzing host or network activity to 
detect intrusions in order to protect information from unauthorized access or manipulation. There are two main 
approaches for intrusion detection: signature-based and anomaly-based. Signature-based detection employs 
pattern matching to match attack signatures with observed data making it ideal for detecting known attacks. 
However, it cannot detect unknown attacks for which there is no signature available. Anomaly-based detection 
uses machine-learning techniques to create a profile of normal system behavior and uses this profile to detect 
deviations from the normal behavior. Although this technique is effective in detecting unknown attacks, it has a 
drawback of a high false alarm rate. In this paper, we describe our anomaly-based IDS designed for detecting 
malicious use of cryptographic and application-level protocols. Our system has several unique characteristics 
and benefits, such as the ability to monitor cryptographic protocols and application-level protocols embedded in 
encrypted sessions, a very lightweight monitoring process, and the ability to react to protocol misuse by 
modifying protocol response directly. 
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Article: 
1 Introduction 
Cryptographic protocols are communication protocols that rely upon cryptography to provide security services 
across distributed systems. Applications are increasingly relying on encryption services provided by 
cryptographic protocols to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and authentication during secure transactions over 
the network. However, the security provided by these encryption services might be undermined if the underly-
ing security protocol
1
 has design or implementation flaws. In fact, research has revealed numerous weaknesses 
in security protocols [Dolev and Yao 1983, Millen et al. 1987, Meadows 1992, Lowe 1996, Mitchell et al. 1997, 
Song 1999] with results ranging from the misuse of encryption [Syverson 1994] to compromising the private 
encryption key [Brumley and Boneh 2003]. Much research in this area has focused on applying formal methods 
for analysis and verification of security protocols, and although much of this research was successful in 
detecting flaws in and improving the protocols, it remains a fact that complete security of cryptographic 
protocols is still a work in progress. Given the imperfect nature of security protocol design, it can be concluded 
that in order to improve the confidence in security protocols, detecting intrusions in those protocols is 
important. 
 
Intrusion detection is a well-studied field, and two main detection approaches have been in use for several 
years: signature-based and anomaly-based. The signature-based approach is effective for detecting known 
attacks, since it matches the monitored data with a database of known attack signatures to detect suspicious 
activities. However, due to its reliance on attack signatures, it is ineffective against previously unknown attacks 
and modified versions of known attacks. In addition, available but imprecise signatures may cause increased 
false positives. Anomaly-based detection tries to ameliorate these problems by focusing on modeling normal 
system behavior in order to be able to detect behavioral deviations. A normal system behavior profile is created 
by observing data over a period of time, and then intrusions are detected as deviations in the monitored 
behavior, enabling anomaly-based detection systems to detect novel attacks. Although this is a distinct 
advantage over signature-based systems, anomaly-based systems have demonstrated difficulty in selecting 
system features in order to characterize normal behavior in such a way that any subtle deviation caused by 
malicious activities is not missed, and at the same time expected deviations do not generate alerts. Further, 
imprecise normal behavior profiles may increase false alerts, limiting the applications of anomaly-based 
systems in practice. However, recent research has introduced a new approach, specification-based detection, 
which has been applied to address the problem of high false positives. The specification-based intrusion 
detection approach uses manually developed specifications to characterize the legitimate system behavior, 
rather than relying on machine-learning techniques to learn the normal behavior, thus eliminating false positives 
caused by legitimate but previously unseen behavior. The advantages of specification-based and anomaly-based 
approaches were combined by [Sekar et al. 2002] in their specification-based anomaly detection system, which 
greatly simplifies feature selection while being able to detect novel attacks. 
 
Given the success of current intrusion detection technology, applying it to detecting intrusions in cryptographic 
protocols seems to be an attractive choice. However, most network intrusion detection systems inspect network 
packet fields in order to match them with attack signatures or to generate a high-level model of interactions 
between communicating principals to detect suspicious activity. These activities are infeasible at the network 
level when protocol sessions are encrypted, which suggests that application level techniques must be employed 
in such a setting. Indeed, recently, Yasinsac [Yasinsac 2000] demonstrated that dynamic analysis of security 
protocols, rather than a static analysis as in the case of formal methods, enables detection of certain class of 
attacks on cryptographic protocols. Yasinsac’s technique is based on protocol-oriented state-based attack 
detection, which reconstructs protocol sessions in terms of state models and matches these with previously 
generated attack state models to detect attacks. However, the attack behavior is modeled as state-machine 
representations of execution traces of known protocol attacks, which is essentially a signature-based technique, 
and hence has a drawback of not being able to detect novel attacks. 
 
1.1 ProtoMon 
Our technique derives inspiration from the specification-based anomaly detection system of [Sekar et al. 2002] 
and inherits its benefits, such as reduced false alarm rate, simplified feature selection and unsupervised learning. 
In this paper, we propose a novel approach of instrumenting shared libraries for cryptographic and application-
level protocols to be able to detect and prevent intrusions in those protocols. Our approach detects attacks on 
protocols embedded in encrypted sessions since we integrate the monitoring into processes taking part in the 
protocols. Monitoring at a gateway or even another process on the same machine will not be able to detect these 
attacks. The framework that we propose has the ability to move data collection and analysis off the host to make 
the performance impact minimal. Also, moving the analysis from the hosts to a central protocol monitor process 
makes it possible to correlate alerts in order to further reduce the false alarm rate and to detect network-wide 
attack patterns, but we did not explore this in our research prototype, and we leave this possibility for future 
work. In addition to describing the system design, we present experimental results to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of our approach in detecting some of the recent attacks on OpenSSL, such as timing attacks and 
password interception [Brumley and Boneh 2003, Canvel et al. 2003]. 
 
2 Related Work 
Intrusion detection is a heavily studied topic, and so in this section we only highlight the work that is most 
directly related to the techniques we propose in this paper. 
 
The most important characteristic of an anomaly-based IDS is its technique for learning ―normal behavior.‖ One 
of the most common approaches is to use probabilistic techniques, learning models of particular features of 
normal network traffic (as is done in the SPADE [Staniford et al. 2002], an anomaly detection plugin for Snort) 
or of other measurable characteristics such as system calls (such as the work of Forrest and Somayaji [Forrest et 
al. 1996, Somayaji and Forrest 2000]). Our approach is somewhat like a combination of these techniques, where 
we model normal network protocol characteristics, but do so in a host-based system so that we can peer into 
encrypted packets. 
 
More advanced modeling techniques have been applied to anomaly detection as well, including cluster analysis 
and data mining. Both NATE [Taylor and Alves-Foss 2001] and CLAD [Arshad and Chan 2003] are anomaly 
detection systems based on cluster analysis; however, both are based on sampling packet fields to determine 
protocol abuse, which is not possible for protocols wrapped in encrypted sessions. An example of data mining 
for anomaly detection is the work of Lee and Stolfo, who propose a system in which normal usage patterns are 
formed by learning (mining) large amounts of audit data [Lee and Stolfo 1998]. While this is an interesting 
direction, the complexity of such a system makes it currently unsuitable for real-time intrusion detection unless 
a distributed detection framework is designed. It is possible for these techniques to be applied indirectly in our 
setting, by incorporating them in the analysis engine, but we leave this possibility to future work. 
 
All of the approaches to anomaly-detection discussed above have one common problem: choosing the correct 
features to be learned in order to create an accurate behavior profile of the system. Consequently, attacks that 
manifest themselves as anomalies in the features not included in the normal behavior profile are likely to be 
missed. This problem is ameliorated by a new variant of anomaly detection, specification-based anomaly 
detection, which uses specifications of protocols given in standard documentation like RFCs to select 
appropriate features. Use of protocol specifications enables manual characterization of legitimate behavior 
rather than learning the normal behavior by observing data over a period of time. As another advantage, this 
approach alleviates the problem of high false positives evidenced in the anomaly detection, by eliminating the 
false positives caused by behaviors that are legitimate but absent in the training data. 
 
Sekar et al. proposed a method, specification-based anomaly detection, that uses state-machine specifications of 
network protocols and statistical learning to map packet sequence properties to properties of state-machine 
transitions for detecting network intrusions [Sekar et al. 2002]. The effectiveness of their approach is evidenced 
at a network gateway by successful detection of most attacks by simply monitoring the distribution of 
frequencies with which each state transition is taken. However, as noted by Sekar et al., current intrusion 
detection techniques rely primarily on inspecting network packet fields to gather information about the system 
behavior, which becomes infeasible when sessions are encrypted. With the advent of IPv6 and wider use of 
IPSec this problem will get worse, as there will be more end-to-end encrypted connections making network-
level detection techniques ineffective for detecting application-level attacks. Our approach addresses this 
problem by embedding the monitoring into the protocol process, thus eliminating the need for inspection at the 
network level. 
 
The problem addressed by our work and others in detecting abuse of security protocols is complementary to the 
problem of designing secure protocols. Extensive work has been done to formally verify and test the security 
protocols to prove that they are secure. Several works have been published on the topic after [Needham and 
Schroeder 1978] expressed the need for techniques for cryptographic protocol analysis, and Dolev and Yao 
[Dolev and Yao 1983] developed a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding the security of restricted class of 
protocols. Based on these foundations, several tools for formally analyzing security protocols were developed 
including special-purpose model-checkers such as the Interrogator [Millen et al. 1987] and the NRL Protocol 
Analyzer [Meadows 1992], and general-purpose model-checkers such as FDR [Lowe 1996] and Mur [Mitchell 
et al. 1997]. More recent work by Song has addressed the problem of state space explosion experienced by 
model checkers, promising more efficient formal analysis tools [Song 1999]. However, given that the protocol 
security problem is undecidable [Cervesato 1999, Heintze 1996], these techniques have limits to their 
completeness, meaning that the analysis tools will not be successful all the time. In addition, turning a protocol 
definition into a concrete implementation often introduces vulnerabilities that are not present in the protocol 
specification. Therefore, supplemental to the formal methods, a mechanism such as ours for detecting misuse of 
cryptographic protocols is highly desirable in the production environment. This argument is further 
strengthened by recent research results that continue to uncover serious flaws in cryptographic protocols 
[Brumley and Boneh 2003, Canvel et al. 2003]. 
More recently, this issue was addressed by Yasinsac who applied classic knowledge-based and behavior-based 
intrusion detection techniques for detecting intrusions in security protocols [Yasinsac 2000, Yasinsac 2002]. 
This technique develops signatures of protocol attacks by gathering information from three sources: 
 
– Known attacks identified in the literature. 
 
– Attack taxonomies identified in the literature. 
 
– Flaws and suspicious activity gathered during execution. 
 
The attack signatures are developed from protocol execution traces modeled as state machines, which are then 
used by the detection system for matching with the state machines that are dynamically built during actual 
protocol execution. Unlike our approach, this approach requires explicit knowledge of attack signatures in terms 
of protocol execution traces, making it a signature-based system. Our approach, using the anomaly-based 
methodology, needs no prior knowledge of attack signatures, thus enabling it to detect novel attacks as well as 
modifications of known attacks. 
 
3 Overview of ProtoMon 
Identifying protocol implementation libraries is our first step for instrumenting embedded monitors in the 
protocol process. We implement the embedded monitors inside shared libraries for security protocols, giving 
those libraries the capability of acting as sensors within our monitoring framework. The benefit is that intrusion 
detection capabilities are inherited by any application which uses the libraries. For example, multiple 
applications on a Linux host may use libssl to protect communication, so instrumenting this one library gives 
monitoring functionality to all these applications. While we found one small problem in providing completely 
application-transparent intrusion detection sensors (see the end of section 3.1.3 for a description), this design 
proved easy to implement and very flexible. It should be noted that unlike traditional IDS sensors which extract 
data from passive sources such as audit logs, our sensors are directly integrated inside the process and generate 
signals as the process executes. 
 
3.1 Generic Protocol Monitoring Framework 
[Fig. 1] shows the basic architecture of our system, which we describe more fully in the remainder of this 
section. Our system is a generic protocol monitoring framework that can be configured as a host-based intrusion 
detection system or as a central protocol monitor for all hosts on a network, moving data collection and analysis 
off the hosts to minimize the performance impact, as illustrated in [Fig. 1]. Our framework consists of three 
main components: the protocol monitor, pluggable protocol behavior profiles, and monitor stubs. We now 
briefly describe each of these components. 
 
3.1.1 The Protocol Monitor. 
The protocol monitor is primarily responsible for collecting and analyzing the protocol state transition 
notifications sent by the stubs and detecting anomalies in the protocol behavior. The anomalies are detected by 
building a short-term profile of the protocol usage and comparing it with the normal behavior profile built 
during the learning phase. We show in section 4 that most of the attacks that are within the scope of our system 
are detected by monitoring the state change notifications. The protocol monitor can be operated in three modes, 
learn, detect, and prevent, which are described next. 
 
Learn mode. In the learn mode, the protocol monitor creates normal behavior profiles for target protocols by 
taking manually developed protocol state-machine specifications and then observing training data for a period 
of time to be able to perform statistical analysis of state transitions reported by monitor stubs. It is important 
that the training data reflects the expected usage pattern of the protocol so that the resultant normal behavior 
profile captures the correct expected behavior, thus reducing the false positives. However, it should be noted 
that since we use the specification-based approach, the scope of the learning phase is limited to statistical 
analysis of legitimate protocol use, rather than learning the legitimate use itself, so this system is less suscep-
tible to false alarms generated by legitimate behavior that is unseen in the training data. Further, the usage 
statistics of the network services, and hence the use of the protocols, can vary significantly depending on day 
and time, so ProtoMon can gather statistics specifically for different time periods. In our experiments we use 6 
different time slots for each day, but this is of course easily adaptable to other usage patterns. The statistics 
collected by the monitor in learn mode are: 
 
— Maximum number of protocol sessions for each time slot. 
 
— Maximum number of broken protocol sessions for each time slot. 
 
— State transition statistics. These include the average of the number of times each state transition is taken. The 
averages are calculated per second, per minute, and per hour to be able to detect attacks that create sudden and 
short-term anomalies as well as attacks that cause slow and relatively long-term anomalies. 
 
At the end of the learning phase the protocol monitor creates a normal behavior profile for each monitored 
protocol by recording and averaging the statistics mentioned above. 
 
Detect mode. The normal protocol behavior profiles created in the learning phase are subsequently used by the 
protocol monitor in the detect mode as a protocol usage baseline, both in terms of legitimate protocol use and 
expected protocol usage statistics. We define a tolerance limit for the deviation of protocol behavior as the 
maximum deviation from the normal behavior that is acceptable and is not flagged as anomalous. The protocol 
monitor creates a short-term protocol usage profile at regular intervals by observing the data and comparing it 
with tolerance limits of the baseline provided by the normal behavior profile to be able to detect specification 
violations and statistical anomalies. To be able to successfully execute an undetected attack, the attack must not 
create any protocol behavior anomalies and must strictly follow the protocol state transition specifications. Any 
attempts that cause specification violations or behavior anomalies are immediately detectable. 
 
Prevent mode. Intrusion response is an active field of research and various approaches are currently in use, with 
the most common using techniques such as blocking traffic from offending IP addresses and forcefully resetting 
connections (e.g., as done by PortSentry [Psionic Technologies]). However, these techniques could be used by 
an adversary to make an IDS block the traffic from non-offending IP addresses causing a denial of service. We 
address this issue, as it pertains to responding to protocol misuse, by using the prevent mode of operation. In 
prevent mode, upon detecting a protocol behavior that rises above the upper tolerance limit, the protocol 
monitor coordinates with the monitor stub and slows down the protocol response. This is possible because of 
our positioning the monitor stubs inside the protocol process, which allows the monitor stub to introduce a delay 
in each protocol state transition as long as the protocol monitor signals anomalous behavior. This is similar to 
some previous systems, including pH’s technique of introducing system-call delays in processes that show 
abnormal behavior [Somayaji and Forrest 2000], and LaBrea’s technique of deliberately slowing the connection 
from suspected scanner machines [LaBrea]. Our embedded stubs force the protocol behavior to remain within 
the upper tolerance limit, causing attacks that need a large number of sessions to be slowed down to the point 
where they are no longer effective. Further, elongating the time needed for the attack to be successful allows for 
human intervention. Also, as a supplemental response to the detected attack, alerts generated by the protocol 
monitor could be used to invoke other response mechanisms, such as at the router, to stop an attack. Since the 
stubs remove the delays once the behavior returns back in the tolerance limit, the protocol is not completely 
halted and our mechanism cannot be used by an attacker to cause an indefinite denial of service. However, it 
should be noted that the prevent mode introduces increased network traffic overhead due to the increased 
communication between the protocol monitor and the monitor stub, as illustrated in Section 4. 
 
Architecture of the Protocol Monitor. The protocol monitor process consists of four threads: listener, validator, 
timer, and counter. [Fig. 1] shows the interaction between these threads and the alerts that they generate. The 
listener collects the state change notifications generated by the monitor stubs and inserts them into a notification 
queue. The validator thread picks up the notifications from the notification queue and validates them against the 
protocol specification to detect any specification violations. It also generates statistics of protocol usage which 
are later used by the counter thread to create a behavior profile. Valid state change notifications are inserted in 
the timer queue for timing each state, which allows the protocol monitor to generate timeout alerts if the 
protocol state machine is aborted before the final state is reached. Observing the number and frequency of 
timeout alerts detects some of the side channel attacks described in Section 4. The counter thread constantly 
compares the normal behavior profile with the short term profile, referred to as ―Runtime statistics”, that it 
generates using the state transition statistics, collected by the validator thread. Significant difference between 
the state transition statistics in the short term profile and the ones in the normal behavior profile are detected as 
anomalies by the counter thread. 
 
3.1.2 Pluggable Protocol Behavior Profiles. 
At the end of the learning phase, protocol behavior profiles are generated for all target protocols. A behavior 
profile has a specification component, which is manually developed in terms of a protocol state-machine by 
studying implementations of the protocol and standard documents like RFCs. The specification component is 
complimented by a statistical component, which is built during the learning phase, in which training data is used 
to learn normal protocol usage statistics. The specification component characterizes legitimate protocol usage in 
terms of valid states, start states, final states, and all valid state transitions. The rationale behind incorporating 
these two components is that some of the attacks cause the protocol to directly violate the protocol specification 
and are thus detected immediately by validations performed against the specification component, whereas 
attacks that may not generate specification violations but merely are manifested as traffic or usage anomalies 
are detected due to the usage baseline provided by the statistical component. It is important that the training data 
resembles the use of the protocol in the target environment to ensure increased precision of behavior profiles, 
and, as stated earlier, we can use different profiles for different time periods. Profiles generated in this way are 
then loaded in to the protocol monitor and are used to be able to enforce legitimate and expected protocol usage 
and to detect attacks as anomalies. 
 
The following is a sample simplified entry in the learned profile of OpenSSL for a weekday afternoon. In this 
example we only show a subset of 13 states, rather than a full specification of SSLv3, which would require 70 
states (and a combined SSLv3 and SSLv2 specification requires 108 states). However, even with the simplified 
example, the basic structure can be seen. 
 
Each line begins with a number of a current state followed by all states reachable from that state and the 
statistics on that particular state transition for three different time intervals: 1 second, 1 minute and 1 hour. This 
enables detection of attacks that create short-term anomalies which might not get manifested as an anomaly in 
relatively long term statistics, as well as attacks that create anomalies in the long-term statistics. 
 
3.1.3 Monitor Stubs. 
Stubs provide a generic interface between the protocol process and the protocol monitor and are integrated into 
shared libraries of the protocol implementation. Integrating the stubs with the protocol libraries allows them to 
capture the protocol activity dynamically, rather than relying on passive methods such as audit logs, and to 
monitor encrypted protocol sessions. Monitor stubs perform a handshake with the protocol monitor to check 
network availability and to know the mode in which the protocol monitor is running (learn, detect, or prevent). 
The stubs send protocol state change notifications to either the local protocol monitor functioning as a host-
based monitoring system, or to a central protocol monitor for network-wide analysis and to reduce the 
performance impact on the host. During the experiments, the process of integrating the stubs with the protocol 
libraries required a very minimal change in the protocol implementation files since the state transitions were 
clearly and directly implemented in the original libraries, which we conjecture would be the case with any well-
written protocol library. 
 
We did experience one problem in creating completely application-independent monitor stubs. Knowing the IP 
address of the source of packets is important for tracking sessions, and for identifying the source of attacks, but 
this information is not necessarily present in the protocol library. In our specific case, we inserted monitor stubs 
in the OpenSSL library, which uses an abstraction for I/O handles. In our initial tests, using sample OpenSSL 
applications, these I/O handles were sockets, and the source IP address could be obtained by calling 
getpeername () on the socket (albeit at the cost of a system call). However, when we experimented with the 
Apache web server using the OpenSSL library, we discovered that the I/O handles in that case actually refer to 
general memory buffers, and Apache itself handles the I/O, converting inputs through a series of filters before 
actually reaching the OpenSSL library. Because of this, the actual I/O socket is several levels removed from 
(and above) the OpenSSL library, and it wasn’t clear how to access the socket to obtain the peer IP address. 
This reveals a problem with our application-independent approach in situations where the application hides the 
source of packets from the security protocol engine. We did not fully fix this problem in our research prototype. 
Our OpenSSL modifications determine whether the I/O handles refer to a socket, in which case the source IP 
address can be determined – in other situations, we simply use a generic IP address for all sessions, losing the 
ability to identify the attacker. We suggest that a production system would include a way for an application to 
register a callback function with the IDS monitor for giving the source IP information, so that if it handles I/O 
itself it can provide the appropriate information. Unfortunately, this means a change must be made in the 
application as well as in the protocol library, but there doesn’t seem to be any way to avoid this. 
 
3.2 Benefits of Approach 
The approach taken by ProtoMon has several distinct benefits and advantages, which we discuss in this section. 
 
Detection of attacks on cryptographic protocols and application-level protocols embedded in encrypted 
sessions. As a primary contribution of our work, our system is able to detect attacks on the application protocols 
that use encryption to provide authentication, key distribution, and other services necessary for secure 
communication between participating principals. Current intrusion detection systems which detect attacks on 
application-level protocols primarily analyze the application-level payload in network packets to match patterns 
of known attacks. Use of encryption by the application-level protocol makes this analysis infeasible since the 
payload is encrypted and can only be decrypted at the application-level. We have addressed this issue by 
positioning our sensors inside the application-level protocol process. Further, application of the specification-
based anomaly detection approach enables detection of known and unknown attacks and should keep the false 
positive rate low. 
 
Generic framework. Although we demonstrate the ability of our system to detect attacks on application-level 
and cryptographic protocols, the design of our framework is generic, meaning it could be applied to any 
arbitrary protocol with clearly defined specifications. As noted earlier, this will allow our system to act as a 
central protocol monitor for the entire network enabling correlation of alerts generated due to behavior 
deviations in protocols running on different hosts. 
 
Response ability. Intrusion response systems aim at preventing or minimizing the damage caused by detected 
intrusions. Detection systems that are based on analyzing information from passive sources such as audit logs 
rely on peripheral response actions such as isolating the target host or changing network firewall rules to block 
traffic from offending IP addresses. However, the response of the application which is under attack does not 
change to defend itself. In our approach, due to their positioning inside the protocol process, the monitor stubs 
enable changing the response of the protocol that is being attacked. 
 
Lightweight. Our system is lightweight meaning it adds minimal overhead to the host that is running the 
monitored protocol. The prevent mode introduces increased overhead, as compared to the detect mode, due to 
the increased communication between the protocol monitor and the stub; however, in this case the entire 
purpose is to slow down protocol response, so additional overhead doesn’t seem to be a particular burden. 
 
4 Experimental Results 
For evaluation purposes we used attacks against OpenSSL, and the OpenSSL version 0.9.6 library under Linux 
was our primary experimental target. 
 
4.1 Experimental setup 
We carried out the experiments on a private LAN with no significant background traffic and with the 
configuration shown in [Fig. 2]. During the learning phase, normal OpenSSL protocol usage was simulated by 
using a four week access log of a real web site. Any instances of attacks in the access log were removed in order 
to exclude the behavior of the protocol during the attack. Statistics collected during the learning phase were then 
used in the detect phase to demonstrate the ability of the system to detect attacks not observed during the 
learning phase. 
 
4.2 Attack Prevention 
We categorize attacks that are within the scope of our system into two general classes: atomic, and non-atomic. 
We denote attacks which need to use the protocol once or for very few times as atomic. On the other hand, 
attacks that are based on using the protocol for a large number of times, such as timing attacks, are referred to as 
non-atomic. Non-atomic attacks are preventable in the prevent mode of the protocol monitor, whereas atomic 
attacks are only detectable. This follows from the fact that we use an approach of slowing down the protocol 
response if the protocol monitor detects the protocol behavior going beyond the upper tolerance limit. Atomic 
attacks do not generate this type of anomaly and hence cannot be prevented by the slow-down mechanism. 
However, our results show that this mechanism is effective in considerably elongating the time taken by an 
ongoing non-atomic attack to complete. The slow-down -factor can be tuned to a value that practically prevents 
the attack from becoming successful. 
 
4.3 Attack Detection 
In this section, we consider 3 different specific attacks on OpenSSL. We emphasize that our intrusion detection 
system is general-purpose and not designed or tuned specifically for these attacks, which are chosen simply as 
representative attacks on SSL that can be found in the literature. 
 
Side-channel attacks. Side-channel attacks have been shown to be possible and practical on cryptographic 
protocols based on RSA encryption routines [Brumley and Boneh 2003, Canvel et al. 2003, Klima et al. 2003, 
Bleichenbacher 1998]. These attacks deduce the private key, or invert the encryption with the help of 
information that is unintentionally leaked by the protocol. In the case of a particular timing attack against 
OpenSSL implementations, it takes around 350,000 accurately timed failed session negotiation attempts to 
break a 1024-bit RSA private key [Brumley and Boneh 2003]. As a general characteristic of these attacks, each 
failed attempt to negotiate a session results in aborting the protocol state-machine before the final handshake 
state is reached. Our protocol monitor times each state and observes the increased number of timeouts, which 
detects these attacks. We simulated the timing attack by tweaking the OpenSSL client library and using a 
dummy SSL client application to repeatedly abort the handshake at a particular state. [Fig. 3] demonstrates the 
increased number of timeouts during the time when the attack is in progress. The attack simulation took 
approximately 6 hours to complete in the detect mode, whereas in the prevent mode, with 1 second delay intro-
duced in the state transitions after the threshold number of sessions were aborted, the stub slowed down the 
protocol and it took an average of 7 seconds per session. As seen, this considerably elongates the time taken for 
the attack to be successful. While the original attack simulation completed all 350,000 probes in approximately 
6 hours, the prevent mode protocol monitor allowed only about 15,420 probes in the first 30 hours. Not only 
would the required 350,000 probes take 680 hours at this rate, but also note that the main characteristic of this 
attack, the timing of protocol events, is disrupted by the protocol delays, rendering the attack completely 
ineffective. 
 
Rollback Attacks. Wagner and Schneier pointed out possible vulnerabilities in the specification of SSL version 3 
[Wagner and Schneier 1996], and we specifically demonstrate detection of version rollback and cipher-suite 
rollback attacks. SSLv3 is susceptible to a version rollback attack in which the client hello message sent by the 
client during session resumption can be intercepted by an intruder to change the version number to 2, thus 
forcing the server to downgrade the version used in the session with that client. If the server finds the session id 
supplied in the client hello message in its cache, it assumes resumption of a previous session, but with a lower 
SSL version and directly proceeds to the finished message. Further, unlike SSLv3, the finished message in 
SSLv2 does not include the version number making this attack undetectable. The downgrading of the SSL 
version by the server exposes the server to several vulnerabilities in SSLv2. To be able to detect this attack, the 
protocol monitor maintains separate session caches for SSLv2 and SSLv3 as suggested by Wagner and 
Schneier. This attack is detected by simply observing a transition from the SSL2 ST SEND SERVER HELLO A 
state to the SSL2 ST SERVER START ENCRYPTION state reported by a monitor stub embedded in SSLv2 for a 
session id that was previously registered with the protocol monitor by a stub in SSLv3. 
 
The cipher-suite rollback attack exploits the fact that the change cipher spec message is excluded from the 
calculation of a MAC on the previous handshake messages, which is used as an authentication code for the 
finished message. The attacker can drop the change cipher spec message causing the server and the client to 
never change the pending cipher-suite to the current cipher-suite, potentially disabling encryption and message 
authentication at the record layer. Although the SSLv3 protocol specification documents the change cipher spec 
message as an optional message, it is most likely a cipher-suite rollback attack if this message is excluded from 
the initial handshake since the initial configuration provides no encryption or authentication, with the exception 
of the session resumption scenario. The protocol monitor requires the change cipher spec message during the 
initial handshake, and dropping this message by the attacker results in a specification violation that is 
immediately detected. 
 
Buffer overflow and denial of service attacks. Buffer overflow vulnerabilities that exist in the implementations 
of SSL protocol routines [CERT 2002b, CERT 2002a] could be exploited to execute arbitrary code on the 
server. For example, an Apache mod_ssl worm exploited a buffer overflow during the SSLv2 handshake 
process. Although the attacker can gain full control of the server by executing this arbitrary code, it should be 
noted that the attacks that fall in this category most likely result in aborting the state-model of the protocol at an 
arbitrary state. The protocol monitor detects this behavior by using the timeout mechanism described earlier. 
The timeout alert could then be correlated with the anomaly in protocol statistics reported to the protocol 
monitor to detect the exploit or denial of service that may be caused by the executed code. 
 
4.4 Behavior comparison 
[Fig. 4] demonstrates the behavior of OpenSSL during the two operating modes: detect and prevent. As seen, 
alerts are generated in both modes when the protocol behavior deviates from the normal behavior beyond the 
tolerance limit. However, in the prevent mode, the protocol monitor signals the monitor stub to insert delays in 
the protocol state transitions upon detection of significant deviation, effectively slowing down the protocol and 
forcing the protocol behavior to be within the upper tolerance limit of the normal behavior. If the protocol 
behavior deviates toward the lower tolerance limit, alerts are generated in both the modes. 
 
 [Fig. 5] illustrates variation in the protocol response time caused by the delays introduced by the stub as a result 
of the protocol monitor signaling the deviation of the protocol behavior beyond the upper tolerance limit. The 
behavior is sampled every second, every minute and every hour. [Fig. 4] shows the behavior sampled every 
minute with the behavior crossing the upper tolerance limit at around 180 seconds into the experiment. As a 
result the protocol response time plotted in [Fig. 5] shows the corresponding increase for the period of 90 
seconds. 
 
In the preliminary report of these results [Joglekar and Tate 2004], the protocol monitor slowed down all clients 
connecting to a particular service whenever an anomaly was detected. Since that time, ProtoMon has been 
enhanced to slow down only particular clients that seem to be causing problems. It is not entirely obvious how 
to do this for statistical anomalies, since the statistics give a total picture of the system behavior, and the 
connection that puts the statistics out of the acceptable range may in fact not be the malicious client. Our 
approach was to use the following heuristic: any client responsible for at least 30% of the recent requests would 
be slowed down. This heuristic may miss a malicious client, and it may incorrectly slow down a non-malicious 
client, but worked well in our tests. We leave the problem of more reliable identification of a malicious client as 
an open problem. 
 
To test this enhancement to ProtoMon, we simulated two clients simultaneously on two separate machines, with 
one client providing malicious behavior and the other client performing within the tolerance limits of the 
behavior profile. [Fig. 6] shows the result of our tests. While the malicious client is slowed down to 
approximately 14 seconds per SSL session when the behavior exceeded the defined tolerance limits, the good 
client continued to operate at full speed. 
 
 
 
4.5 Performance Overheads 
Given that cryptographic computations based on public key algorithms such as RSA are complex and resource 
intensive, it is desirable to minimize the overhead added by any mechanism that aims at detecting intrusions in 
protocols based on these algorithms. This section shows overheads in the performance of the OpenSSL protocol 
implementation caused by our detection and prevention mechanism, as measured with our experimental setup of 
[Fig. 2]. 
 
4.5.1 Network Bandwidth. 
The monitor stub sends state transition notifications to the protocol monitor over the network when they are 
running on different hosts, resulting in additional network traffic. The following table shows the average 
network traffic overhead over 3409 SSL protected HTTP requests, with requests sampled from a production 
web server. Measured sizes indicate the size of complete IP datagrams, including all IP and TCP or UDP header 
information, and measurements were taking by analyzing a ―tcpdump‖ sniffer log of actual traffic during the 
entire experiment. The request sequence had an average data response size of 7344 bytes, with an average of 
2610 additional bytes in overhead due to SSL messages, HTTP headers, and TCP/IP headers. The ProtoMon 
overhead, including IP and UDP headers, was approximately 728 bytes per SSL session in detect mode. In 
prevent mode, additional packets are required to notify the protocol engine to slow down, giving a slightly 
higher overhead, but only when malicious behavior has been detected. These results are summarized in the 
following table, where the percentages reflect the percent of total traffic (SSL and ProtoMon) due to the 
ProtoMon traffic. 
 
 
 
Reducing Network Overhead. Since our initial implementation and test results with ProtoMon were reported, we 
have implemented a ―traffic aggregator‖ to reduce network overhead. This is simply a process that sits on the 
monitored machine, and collects multiple state change notifications into a single, larger UDP packet. Since the 
notification data itself is quite small, much of the ProtoMon overhead reported above is actually IP and UDP 
header information, and by accumulating several of these notifications into a single packet, we can significantly 
reduce the amount of bandwidth required. In particular, the traffic aggregator collects state change notifications 
until one of two things happens: either a long packet is filled up, or one second of time has elapsed. At this 
point, the collected data is sent to the protocol monitor in a single packet. In addition, since much information is 
repeated between successive state change notifications (the source and destination address information is 
repeated, and the destination state of one transition is the source state of the next), additional space can be saved 
by carefully coding the notifications. These two changes taken together significantly reduced the amount of 
network overhead required by ProtoMon, as illustrated by the measurements shown in the following table. 
 
While this network overhead is very modest, we note that network impact can be basically eliminated by using 
a second network card and routing ProtoMon traffic over a different network. 
 
4.5.2 Protocol Response Time. 
As described in Section 4. 1, we used the normal behavior profile of OpenSSL to detect anomalies in the detect 
and prevent modes of operation. The following table shows average response time of the OpenSSL enabled web 
server per request after anomalies have been detected. 
 
Prevent mode slows down the protocol response by the factor of approximately 4.4 for the purpose of this 
experiment. This slow-down-factor can be tuned to a desired value by adjusting the delays introduced by the 
monitor stubs. Consequently, the time taken by any attack that spans across multiple protocol sessions can be 
elongated when the protocol monitor is running in the prevent mode. 
 
4.5.3 Processor overhead. 
When the protocol monitor is used as a host-based detection mechanism it uses processor time on the server. 
Our experiment involving measurements of processor overhead were carried out by using the protocol monitor 
as a host-based detection system. We used a host with a Pentium4 2GHz processor to run the protocol and the 
protocol monitor. The results, in the following table, show the percentage increase in the processor usage by the 
protocol process when the protocol monitor is used in learn, detect, and prevent mode. 
 
This overhead can be minimized by placing the protocol monitor process on a separate, central host, which has 
the added benefit of enabling network-wide alert analysis and correlation. 
 
5 Future Work 
Although our results indicate that our approach of embedding monitors inside the executing protocol process 
detects and prevents attacks on those protocols, there remain several open research issues that need further 
attention. 
 
First, it is possible to apply more advanced learning techniques and models to building comprehensive behavior 
profiles. Further research is needed in applying such models to enhance the precision of the normal behavior 
profile. Adaptive learning strategies could be employed to be able to continuously modify the normal behavior 
profile to take into account legitimate and expected changes in the protocol usage patterns. 
 
In addition, the high false alarm rate experienced by anomaly-based intrusion detection systems is a current 
research topic. We believe that alerts caused by protocols running on various nodes in the network could be 
correlated to reduce false alarms generated by a centralized protocol monitoring process. This argument is 
strengthened by the fact that a successful attack performed by an active attacker often involves compromising 
various network services on the network to cause maximum damage. Consequently, the protocols used by these 
network services, if monitored at a centralized protocol monitor, should cause alerts that could be correlated for 
a more comprehensive and correct attack detection. 
 
As discussed in Section 4, our current system is able to prevent non-atomic attacks on cryptographic protocols. 
Further research is needed in order to be able to include atomic attacks in the scope of the response mechanism 
proposed in this paper. It could be possible to implement the monitor stub as a wrapper around the protocol 
process, synchronously validating all the state transitions before passing them on to the protocol process. This 
should allow detection of atomic attacks: for example, the cipher suite rollback attack could be prevented by 
first validating the state transition to detect the dropping of the change cipher spec message and then aborting 
the session to prevent the unprotected session from continuing. However, this process of complete mediation of 
all state transitions would almost certainly slow down the protocol response significantly, even under non-attack 
conditions. 
 
6 Conclusion 
The main issue addressed by this paper is real-time detection of intrusion attempts in application level protocols 
encapsulated inside encrypted sessions. The results shown in this paper illustrate that embedding the monitor 
stubs inside the cryptographic protocol process restricts the avenues available to the attacker to those attacks 
that create neither protocol specification violations nor protocol usage behavior anomalies, both of which are 
detectable by our proposed system. The impact on both the machine being monitored and the network usage is 
minimal, if the protocol monitor analysis engine is on a separate system. As another contribution, this paper 
demonstrates that slowing down the protocol response is an effective way to prevent certain types of protocol 
attacks and minimize the damage to the system. 
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